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OPERATIONAL DECEPTION: HISTORICAL RETROSPECT AND FUTURE UTILITY

by

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Michael I. Handel
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The purpose of this discourse is to prove the significant advantages that deception operations will provide in any future conflict. The potential use of deception as a "force multiplier," renders its understanding by the operational commander as imperative. This understanding is critical as deception used incorrectly can have grave consequences. The proper use of deception and the resultant effects on the principles of war provide the operational commander with distinct advantages. Through historical analysis of two World War II deception operations, lessons can be derived as a result of both the failures as well as the successes of these operations. Theses lessons are intended to span the ages of time so as not to limit there future utility. Deception is not intended to be a substitute for sound operational planning but rather as another tool for the operational commander to utilize. With the advent of technology, the ability to deceive in the future comes into question. Will this ability be enhanced or will it be thwarted? In the final

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

PROBLEM STATEMENT:

The utilization of deception operations on the battlefield undoubtedly has its roots since the beginning of time. Over two millennium ago the warrior Sun Tzu boasted:

> "All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near we must make the enemy believe that we are away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him."[1]

The purpose of this discourse is to examine the use of deception in order to prove the significant advantages that deception operations will provide in any future conflict. Unfortunately, since the days of World War II, there has been a proclivity for the United States military to forgo this opportunity in favor of conventional operations or "the American way of war." The potential use of deception in any future conflict as a "force multiplier," renders its understanding by the operational commander as imperative. To overlook this multiplier or to apply it incorrectly is to forgo an advantage and invite disaster. This is not to suggest that deception is a panacea that alone will win wars, but rather that an understanding of the potential uses of deception is imperative if it is to be successfully employed.

APPROACH TO TOPIC:

Chapter II of this discourse will begin with an examination of what operational deception is as well as the benefits that deception provides to the operational commander. Chapter III will then explore the historical use of deception operations in W.W. II through analysis of both its successes as well as its failures. Chapter IV will then address the lessons learned from the previous historical examples so that the use of deception can be effectively applied in future operations. The future of operational deception will then be examined in chapter V through analysis of technology and the resultant potential effects on deception. Chapter VI will present recommendations for this often overlooked area as well as concluding remarks.

OPERATIONAL DECEPTION: DESCRIPTION AND IMPORTANCE

WHAT IS DECEPTION?

Professor Michael I. Handel, a leading author on the use of deception, defines deception as:

> "A purposeful attempt by the deceiver to manipulate the perceptions of the target's decision makers in order to gain a competitive advantage."[2]

Joint Pub 0-1 further defines deception as:

> "Any scheme to attain enemy action or inaction by influencing their understanding of the situation.[3]

In both definitions, the purpose of deception is to mislead, misinform or confuse an opponent by either deceiving him concerning one's <u>intentions</u> or by deceiving him concerning one's <u>capabilities</u>.[4]

When a country attempts to deceive regarding intentions then the objective is to conceal actual goals and plans through either secrecy (passive mode) or a deliberate plot (active mode).[5] When a country attempts to deceive regarding capabilities then the aim is to cloak "real" capabilities by either exaggerating one's own capabilities or concealing existing capabilities.[6] This results in the adversary either underestimating or overestimating the deceiver's real strength. The dangers of employing deception that overestimates one's own strengths should be readily apparent. If the commander attempts to bluff, and the adversary decides to attack, then the operational commander will find himself in an extremely disadvantageous position. Therefore, the commander must employ this type of deception with extreme

caution. This is not to suggest that intentions or capabilities deception are mutually exclusive, but rather that they are mutually supporting in an overall deception operation.

THE BENEFITS OF DECEPTION:

One of the primary benefits that deception operations provide is as a force multiplier. With very little expenditure in either labor or capital, deception operations have the ability to reap enormous returns.[7] Moreover, even if deception were expensive, it would be worth the expense if decisive results could be achieved. Because of the ability of deception to be very successful with little expenditure, the tendency is for weaker states to employ its use in order to compensate for its inadequacies.[8]

With the possible exception of the former Soviet Union, history has shown a strong correlation among stronger states tending to overlook deception. A stronger state tends to believe that with numerical superiority or technology, that there is no need to deceive. If this were the case then all wars would be a foregone conclusion as the larger force would always prevail.[9] This is an imperative point for all U.S. operational commanders to heed. Subsequent to World War II, the tendency has been to look for the decisive battle and "the American way of war." However, to overlook the synergistic effects that this inexpensive art employs, is to needlessly jeopardize the success of an operation with unnecessary risks and casualties. As Sun Tzu said, "to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."[10]

The use of deception and the resultant effects on the principles of war are significant. In particular, deception provides the operational commander with distinct advantages in the following five principles of war:

1. Principle of mass. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5 defines mass as, "the effects of overwhelming combat power on the decisive place and time."[11] The successful use of deception will result in the enemy concentrating his forces in the wrong "decisive place," while the antithesis will result for the deceiver.[12]

2. Principle of manuever. Manuever is defined as the ability to, "place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power."[13] Again, the ability to deceive the enemy and force him to concentrate his forces in the wrong area gives the deceiver the ability to manuever his forces in order to obtain the best positional advantage.

3. Principle of economy of force. This principle suggests the "employment of all combat power available in the most effective way possible while allocating minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts."[14] The objective here is for the deceiver to compel the enemy to consume his resources toward unintended areas or non-existent targets.[15] This leaves the deceiver with the ability to judiciously employ and distribute his own forces in order to achieve mass elsewhere.

4. **Principle of offense.** With the ability to achieve agility on the battlefield, deception allows the operational commander to, "seize, retain and exploit the initiative."[16] In this regard the use of deception can effect the "center of gravity" as well. Although the operational commander may recognize the enemy center of gravity he may not be able to take the offensive to defeat it. Deception gives this initiative back by forcing the enemy to do something he did not plan on doing.

5. **Principle of surprise.** "Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared."[17] This is undoubtedly the most important principle which operational deception renders. Clausewitz wrote:

> "Surprise lies at the root of all military activity without exception."[18]

Yet Clausewitz afforded little to the relevancy of deception in his writings stating:

> "It is dangerous, in fact to use substantial forces over any length of time merely to create an illusion."[19]

Nonetheless, in all warfare deception is one of the basic tenants that allows surprise to be achieved. The ability of the operational commander to successfully deceive will catch the enemy off guard and unprepared and thus allow the deceiver to surprise the opponent.

The ability to deceive also requires an understanding of how it effects the principles of security and unity of command and must therefore be addressed. The principle of security argues to, "never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected

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advantage."[20] All surprise rests upon concealment and the capacity to safely secure this concealment.[21] It is therefore imperative that the operational commander maintain strict security with regards to deception operations but at the same time maintain a unity of command as well as effort among all involved participants. A compromised deception plan or a deception plan not properly coordinated can have consequences much graver than had no deception plan been attempted at all.

An understanding of what deception is and what it is able to provide the operational commander is essential if forces are to be properly employed. What deception is not is, "a swift panacea to be invoked when other remedies have failed."[22] What deception does provide is another tool for the operational commander to utilize in order to obtain an advantage over the adversary.

CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL USE OF DECEPTION

This chapter will examine two operations in W.W. II where the use of deception operations were significantly employed. In the first example, "Operation Bodyguard," (the deception associated with the invasion of Normandy) will examine the _successful_ employment of deception operations. The second example will explore the _failures_ of deception operations by examining there use in "Operation Cockade." An understanding of this historical treatise is imperative for developing lessons learned that can be employed in future operations.

Before beginning this historical treatise it is first important to examine deception and its use in "Operational Art." Joint Pub 3-0 defines Operational Art as:

> "The use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, and execution of campaigns and major operations."[23]

It is at the operational level where the tactical employment of forces are linked to the strategic objectives. In the historical examples to be explored, operational deception in support of the theatre of operations is no different. It was the combination of deception on all three levels of war which inextricably linked Operational Art, and ultimately determined its success or failure.

OPERATION BODYGUARD:

The use of deception preceding and throughout the invasion of Normandy were in fact a combination of deception operations intended to deceive Germany regarding where the actual location of the invasion would occur. In this regard, the primary intent was to deceive regarding one's intentions although certainly the use of deception regarding capabilities was employed as well. The overall deception strategy for a number of cover and deception operations for the invasion of Normandy was codenamed "Bodyguard."

The intent of Bodyguard was twofold. First, it would cause Hitler to disperse his forces throughout Europe so that he would have insufficient strength to defeat the amphibious assault on Normandy. Second, It would delay Hitler's response to the actual invasion by confusing and suppressing German signals intelligence (SIGINT) and administrative systems.[24] In order to achieve these objectives bodyguard would fabricate an extremely credible war plan which would ultimately mislead Hitler regarding the time and place of the invasion.[25] Certainly an overall warplan could not simply be handed over to the Germans, but would have to be leaked in small and subtle ways if was to be believed.

Bodyguard consisted of 36 subordinate plans and associated strategies that were ultimately designed to convince the Germans that the allies would continue a peripheral strategy and would be unable to attempt a cross channel attack prior to July 1944.[26] However, for this discourse the primary operational deception

plan discussed is "Operation Fortitude," which consisted of operations "Fortitude North" and "Fortitude South."

OPERATION FORTITUDE:

Fortitude was the most ambitious of the deception operations in W.W. II. This broad plan, covering deception operations in the European theatre, had three formally defined objectives:

> "1) To cause the Wehrmacht (German intelligence) to make faulty strategic dispositions in north-west Europe before Neptune (Normandy invasion) by military threats against Norway, 2) to deceive the enemy as to the target date and the target area of Neptune, 3) to induce (the enemy to make) faulty tactical dispositions during and after Neptune by threats against Pas de Calais."[27]

Fortitude would therefore be divided into two parts. "Fortitude North" was aimed at Norway and other Scandinavian countries and was designed to tie down twenty seven German divisions by leading the Germans to expect a joint British, Russian and American invasion.[28] "Fortitude South" was aimed at projecting an invasion force towards Pas de Calais while also convincing the Germans that Normandy was only a diversion.[29]

Perhaps most importantly, all deception operations for Fortitude were planned at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) under Colonel John Bevan, Chief, London Controlling Section (LCS). With Eisenhower's sound approval of the entire deception scheme, unity of effort was ensured.

FORTITUDE NORTH:

Once the decision was made to invade Europe through Normandy vice Pas de Calais, it then became imperative to convince the

Germans that other parts of northern and northwestern Europe were also subject to attack. The only problem with this strategy was that there were virtually no forces available for such an attack. Therefore, a deception force of over 350,000 troops would have to be invented.[30] This part of the operation would be capabilities based and was designed to convince the German's that the joint forces were capable of such an invasion when in fact they were not. The resultant German forces that would be tied up in the north would then give Eisenhower a significant advantage regarding the principles of war discussed in the previous chapter.

In order to "invent" this fictitious Army, a staff consisting of only twenty officers arrived in Scotland and established a "corp" by transmitting message traffic in cipher, plain text and radiotelephony that an Army would have utilized.[31] Battalions spoke to brigades and brigades to divisions and so on up the line.[32]

In addition, hundreds of wooden twin engine aircraft were placed on Scottish airfields while hundreds of actual warships (the ones that would actually be used during the Normandy invasion) were assembled around the Scottish coast in order to accentuate the deception.[33] As a final measure to seal the reliability of the deception, German agents, under the control of the British, validated the deception. The multilateral plan also involved the Russians as they leaked intelligence indicating that they were concentrating for an attack on Norway.[34]

By the time of the Normandy invasion, a notional force had been established that consisted of over a quarter of a million men with its own tactical air command and 350 tanks and armored fighting vehicles.[35]

The result of Fortitude North was that the Germans not only left the garrisons in Norway, but actually reinforced them to counter the perceived invasion.[36] By the spring of 1944, the Germans had 13 Army divisions, 90,000 naval, 60,000 air, 12,000 paramilitary, and 6000 SS personnel stationed in Norway.[37] Th forces were not only present when the actual Normandy invasio. occurred but were also still there when the Germans eventually surrendered.

The watchwords of this operation were unity of effort and economy of force. The corroboration of all unified forces were essential if this operation was to be successful. What is also significant is that this was accomplished with limited resources.

FORTITUDE SOUTH:

The success of Fortitude North, pales in comparison with the success emanated by that of Fortitude South. The primary objective of this portion of the deception operation was intention based. This portion of the operation was designed to convince the Germans that the actual invasion would take place at Pas de Calais where the channel is narrowest and that Normandy was nothing more than a diversion.

In order for this ruse to be successful it was first important to establish a notional Army that would be used for the

invasion at Pas de Calais. Who better than to spearhead this
fictional army than General Patton who was known and respected by
the Germans and who would no doubt be expected to partake in any
invasion of France.[38] The First United States Army Group
Headquarters (FUSAG), was thus notionally established at
Wentworth, opposite Pas de Calais. With Patton as the Commander,
this would be the core of Fortitude South.[39]

The use of message traffic again carried fictional
administrative and operational movement which confirmed the
impression of a force consisting of over 150,000 men.[40]

Double agents were also extensively used in order to
successfully create this fictitious command. What was critical
for the double agents to convey was not only the need to deceive
the Germans regarding the location of the assault, but also to
foster doubt as to whether it was coming at all.[41] In order for
success to be achieved and for the agents credibility to remain
intact, a significant amount of true information would have to be
passed along with the false information.

The success of the actual invasion of Normandy would
obviously only be successful with "real" vice notional forces and
it is here that perhaps one of the most complicated portions of
the deception operation occurred. An essential component for the
success of Overlord was the redeployment of seven divisions as
well as some seventy landing craft from the Mediterranean to
Great Britain.[42] Herein rests the problem as allied strength in
the Mediterranean still needed to be emphasized in order to keep

Axis troops tied down and not deployed to France.[43] The ruse was thus created that the landing craft were returning to Great Britain for repair and that only seasoned battle weary troops were being withdrawn from the Mediterranean.[44]

Finally, as the actual invasion approached, allied air forces dropped three times the tonnage of bombs in the Pas de Calais area as that of Normandy.[45] Additionally, the intensity of the bombing patterns were gradually increased so as to not reveal when or even if an invasion would take place.[46] Of the 49 airfields attacked before D-Day, eleven were in the Pas de Calais area and only four in the area of the actual landing.[47] As the final hour arrived, the Navy continued the deception operation in the Calais area by utilizing sonic and other devices to simulate anchors and landing craft being lowered while the Air force conducted a series of airdrops with dummies.[48]

The success of deception during "Operation Fortitude" cannot be overemphasized. Only eight hours before the actual invasion began Hitler's staff concluded, "that the invasion is actually imminent, does not seem to be indicated as yet."[49] Not only were the Germans deceived as to where the landing would take place but they were deceived as to the timing as well.

WHY FORTITUDE SUCCEEDED:

Why Fortitude succeeded can be summarized in the following: First, Hitler and the German Staff expected a cross channel invasion sooner or later and at the same time were obsessed with Norway. Thus, all that needed to be accomplished was to

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reinforce these beliefs but on terms favorable to the allies.
Second, the deception operations all made operational sense.
That is, they were realistic and operationally feasible. Third,
all resources needed for the deception operation were made
available. Both the Navy and Air force provided resources, which
they may have preferred to use elsewhere, in order to support the
overall operational deception plan. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, unity of effort was preserved throughout. Deception
planning was done concurrently with operational planning and
coordination was maintained during the entire operation. As a
result, opposing goals and objectives were eliminated.

Deception played a significant role in the operational
success of the allied invasion but as shall be examined shortly,
deception is a double edged sword which inadequately applied can
be more detrimental than not using it at all.

OPERATION COCKADE:

The achievements of deception in Operation Overlord can give
one the impression that its use will always be fraught with
success. This is certainly not the case. An examination of its
failures must be addressed so that the operational commander can
learn from past mistakes as well as avoid the conclusion that
deception is a substitute when other methods fail.

In stark contrast to Fortitude, "Operation Cockade" was an
abysmal failure. The plan began in February 1943. The objective
of this operation was to tie down as many German troops as
possible in northwest Europe in order to prevent them from being

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utilized on the eastern front or in Italy.[50] Additionally, the
plan employed a deception scheme that would compel the Germans to
believe that the allies would attempt a cross channel invasion
sometime during the summer of 1943.[51] This deception would then
climax in a feint attack designed to induce air battles with the
Luftwaffe on terms favorable to the allies so that the Luftwaffe
could be destroyed.[52]

Cockade was the overall deception plan and was composed of
the following three separate deception operations: "Starkey" was
the portion of the operation that would create an amphibious
feint across the channel in the area of Pas de Calais; "Wadham"
was a fictional operation designed to imply a large scale
American landing in Brittany; and "Tindall" was another
fictitious operation intended to tie down the Germans in Norway
by creating a limited landing and airborne threat to Stavanger.[53]
"Starkey" was the main component of "Cockade" and will thus be
the operation addressed.

OPERATION STARKEY:

Starkey was commanded by Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-
Mallory, Commander-in-Chief Fighter Command, and General Ira C.
Eaker, Commander United States Eighth Air Force.[54] The resulting
amphibious feint was designed to engage the Luftwaffe in
intensive fighting over a period of two weeks by threat of
invasion at Pas de Calais.[55] The plan called for actual troops
supplemented by two fictitious corps representing 60,000 men; an
actual naval force consisting of over a hundred ships; and an Air

Force that would actually carry out some 6,000 sorties.[56] Various troop and ship movements, coupled with press and radio reports, and the use of double agents were all designed to make it appear that an invasion was imminent.[57]

It was at this point that the deception operation began to break down. Neither the Navy nor the Air Force were willing to endanger their forces simply for a fake operation.[58] The Bomber Command felt that any type of mock invasion would be nothing more than a diversion from the bomber offensive.[59] Air Marshal Sir Arthur "Bomber" Harris called the deception, "at best a piece of harmless play-acting."[60] In the end, the bomber offensive would continue and only Operational Training Units would take part in the deception.[61]

The Naval side of the operation fared no better. The admiralty argued that the battleships could not destroy the heavy coastal artillery and in fact might be destroyed themselves.[62] The use of Battleships in the deception operation were thus eliminated. Without the display of a substantial number of naval vessels, Starkey had little chance of impressing the enemy. It was argued that unless the Luftwaffe observed battleships in the invasion they would not "take the Bait."[63]

The physical deception of "Starkey" was also a disaster from the beginning. Headed by the Air Ministry, the resources provided were totally inadequate to present an effective deception.[64] The dummy and real craft available were so few that setting up fake lighting to simulate force movement was a waste

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of effort as the visible craft could not possibly carry the number of troops portrayed in the deception.[65] It was therefore decided to use lighting only in an attempt to attract enemy bombers away from actual troop concentrations. However, there was so much lighting along the south coast already that fake lighting had to be kept unnaturally high in hopes that it would attract the enemy's attention.[66]

In addition, the use of the press as an unwitting accomplice in the deception operation began to turn the ruse into a self fulfilling prophecy. The fear was that the French resistance (who would not be informed that the operation was a deception) would begin to uprise, leaving them in an extremely vulnerable position.[67] In fact, the continual reporting of an impending invasion coupled with over 3,000 air raids in twenty days, resulted in numerous French uprisings as invasion fever came to a pitch.[68] Only a further deception that it was the Germans who were circulating rumors of an invasion quelled additional resistance.[69]

On 9 September 1943 "D-Day" arrived. Bombers attacked French coastal batteries and airfields while the convoys proceeded to within ten miles of the French coast.[70] The result was that not a single enemy vessel came out to meet the fleet nor did a single enemy aircraft venture over the channel.[71] A radio intercept of a German observer overlooking the "invasion" force summarized the reaction best as he exclaimed, "what is all the fuss over there?"[72] Operation Starkey had been a complete

failure as the primary objective of luring the Luftwaffe into the ultimate battle had not come close to fruition. Starkey had been for naught.

WHY STARKEY FAILED:

Why Operation Starkey failed can be seen as essentially the antithesis of why Fortitude succeeded. First, in 1943 the Germans did not have any pre-conceived notion that a cross-channel invasion was possible.[73] As will be discussed in the following chapter, it is easier to reinforce existing beliefs than it is to create new ones. Second, the allies were not willing to allocate scarce resources simply for a deception plan that had no operational utility.[74] As a result, Bomber Command and the Admiralty refused to participate to the extent needed. Third, the deception operations were poorly coordinated among the various agencies participating in the operation.[75] This resulted in mass confusion as no one agency knew what the other was doing. Additionally, the operation attempted to use unwitting participants as evidenced with the French resistance. Fourth, The deception plans were unrealistic and made little operational sense, rendering them unfeasible to the German's.[76] Fifth, Starkey was so obvious as to be almost absurd. An after action report described the operational movements as, "rather too obvious-it was evident they were bluffing."[77]

It is through this historical experience that an examination of the future of deception operations can begin. What can be learned as a result of the failures of Starkey as well as the

successes of Fortitude will therefore be discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV

LESSONS LEARNED

As George Santayana noted, "unless we understand history, we are condemned to repeat it." Lessons learned can be derived from one's failures as well as one's successes. In this regard, the need to glean lessons from the historical use of deception in W.W. II is no exception. This chapter will therefore examine the lessons that must be applied to future uses of deception if success is to be realized. Although the lessons learned are derived from the previous historical treatise they are intended to span the ages of time so as not to limit there future utility.

Lesson one: Deception must reinforce what the enemy already believes. This is the premise of what is termed "Magruder's Principle" which states, "it is generally easier to maintain a preexisting belief than to present notional evidence to change that belief."[78] The use of this principle can be seen in the examination of the invasion of Normandy. It was Hitler's belief, as well as many of his senior advisors, that any invasion of France would come through Pas de Calais.[79] The allies were aware of this and therefore, any deception plan needed to revolve around reinforcing this belief. Even when Hitler's intelligence staff suggested that Normandy may be the actual sight of the invasion, the response from Berlin was, "possible, but not very likely."[80]

Additionally, Hitler had an obsession with Norway as well. This resulted in German intelligence attempting to do whatever they could to corroborate these expectations.[81] The notional Army created thus reinforced what German intelligence and Hitler wanted to believe.

Operation Starkey on the other hand is a complete failure to understand this principle. During this time frame a cross channel invasion was not seen as even a possibility, therefore an attempt to create this notion was completely overlooked by the Germans.

However, it must be recognized that before this type of deception can be utilized, it is first imperative to understand what the enemy believes so that these notions can be reinforced. With this understanding the lesson heeded is that any attempt by the operational commander to deceive by changing preexisting notions is doomed for failure.

Lesson two: Deception must make operational sense. In this regard any deception plan must appear feasible to the enemy.[82] Starkey was a failure in that the limited participation of naval and air assets indicated the impossibility of attempting any type of cross channel invasion. Starkey was also so obvious as to be almost ludicrous. For deception to be successful it requires the enemy to have to work hard to obtain the information.[83] If not, it will almost assuredly be ignored, or worse, used against oneself. Additionally, any deception plan must support an actual operation.[84] Had the Germans taken the bait in Starkey they

would have quickly realized that the entire operation was a ruse. The result of this would have done more harm than good. The Germans would have reevaluated their entire intelligence system and the results could have been catastrophic for the British double agent system as well as the French resistance. Ironically, the failure of Starkey was a blessing in disguise. The operational commander must therefore always utilize deception in support of an actual operation and must utilize it realistically.

Lesson three: Adequate resources must be available for deception to be successful. If the resources needed for a successful deception are not available than the deception operation should not be attempted. Attempting to deceive with insufficient resources will not fool anyone any may have dire consequences. Starkey again showed the futility of attempting to deceive with too few ships, aircraft and dummy craft. "The effort put into diversions should always more than repay the loss of effort thereby incurred in the main attack." [85] Deception is cheap but it is not free. If the operational commander is going to employ deception than it must be done with the resources needed or must not be done at all.

Lesson Four: Deception must attempt to acclimatize the enemy. What is suggested by this is that human nature is very susceptible to conditioning.[86] In this regard gradual acclimatization of the enemy is extremely important in all deception schemes. The success of this type of conditioning can

be seen in the invasion of Normandy and the resultant limited reaction. Prior to the invasion the radar stations along the Normandy coast were jammed. The Germans did not respond to this jamming due to the fact that they had been repeatedly jammed in the past.[87] As a result of this conditioning the jamming was simply ignored. Acclimatization takes very little effort and therefore should be of prime consideration to the commander.

   Lesson five: Deception must combine truths as well as lies. In order for deception to be successful it must contain primarily truths if it is to be believed. This is perhaps the most difficult task for the operational commander as he will most likely be extremely reluctant to divulge any of his actual operational plans as part of a ruse. However, without divulging mostly truths, one cannot expect the lies to be believed. There are however some safeguards that can prevent too much of the truth from being exposed.[88] First, trivial information or information that the enemy would acquire in the near future should be allowed to be released. This was the case in the Normandy invasion as actual units were passed on in order to support Patton's fictitious Army.[89] Second, important information can be released so when obtained by the enemy it would be too late to react to anyway. This was again the case in Normandy as double agents relayed that an invasion was imminent. It was critical information but of little value, coming only hours before the actual invasion. The operational commander will

certainly be reluctant to release operational details, but the benefits can more than outweigh the costs.

Lesson Six: Deception must involve a unity of effort. If deception is to be successful than it cannot be done in a vacuum. What this proposes is that actual operations and deception operations must be coordinated as part of the overall plan. A deception plan attempted outside of operational channels is foreordained to failure as evidenced in the Starkey operation. Without the unity of effort among the naval and air staffs and the need for their cooperation, success was impossible. The following summarizes this effect on Starkey:

> "The deceptionists prescribed the scale of operations needed to produce the desired effect on German intelligence, but when for one reason or another that scale had to be drastically reduced, they continued to hope, or perhaps pretend, that the modified plans would still be effective."[90]

The operational commander must therefore insist that plans are coordinated not only among the military staffs but among other agencies and other countries involved as well. Support and understanding by both senior civilian as well as military leaders is essential. The risk of overexposure of the deception operation on security is certainly a legitimate concern and must be addressed, but without a unity of effort the plans will fail.

Certainly the preceding discussion is not an attempt to be an all inclusive list but rather a starting point for any operational commander to consider when utilizing deception. Deception utilized incorrectly can have consequences far worse than had it not been attempted at all. Thus, if history is to

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avoid repeating itself than the lessons learned as a result of its failures must be appreciated.

CHAPTER V

THE FUTURE OF DECEPTION

What will the future hold for the operational commander and his ability to employ deception? Will the use of advanced technologies limit the ability to effectively deceive or will new technologies allow for the better employment of deception? These are questions that will be examined in this chapter as the role of deception in the future is explored.

One cannot examine the future of deception without first examining the capabilities of technology and its effect on deception. Many would argue that with the advent of high resolution satellites, sensors and radars the ability to effectively conceal and camouflage and ultimately deceive is impossible.[91] This argument is rejected for the following reasons:

First, if history has shown us anything it is that technological advances are short lived as one side quickly develops new technologies to thwart these advantages. Although the United States may currently possess the capability to detect large scale movements, this may not be the case in the future. Adversary nations will not only seek these new technologies but will also pursue ways to deceive them. This would suggest that despite innovations, countermeasures are rapidly developed to thwart new technologies. An example of this can be seen in W.W. II through the British development of "window" (now known as

chaff) as a countermeasure to radar. Most striking in this example was the reluctance of the allies to utilize this new technology for fear that the Germans would later utilize it to their benefit.[92] This could put future operational commanders on the horns of a dilemma as they must weigh the benefits to be realized to the risks of exposing new technologies. Additionally, technology is often easier to deceive then humans. Sensors designed to accomplish specific tasks can often be manipulated through interference, jamming or other modes.

Second, technological advances can be one's own worst enemy. As has been demonstrated earlier in this discourse, the tendency has been for strong, technologically advanced nations to forgo the use of deception. If an operational commander does not predispose himself to the use of deception then the operational commander will most likely not be looking for it. It is at this juncture that the operational commander is most susceptible to deception. If the commander believes that the technology employed is always correct, then new enemy countermeasures will probably be overlooked as the adversary reinforces what is already believed.

Finally, the use of technology is still only a part of any deception plan. In the final analysis all deception comes down to intentions and capabilities. The ability of the operational commander to persuade or dissuade the enemy is ultimately reliant on enemy perceptions which are not necessarily implanted as a result of technology. The Gulf war is a case in point. Saddam

Hussein expected an amphibious assault on Kuwait and all the technology in the world would probably have done little to dissuade him otherwise. With an amphibious feint, it took little technology for General Schwarzkopf to reinforce this perception.

The previous arguments are certainly not intended to minimize the potential use that technology offers the operational commander in the ability to either deceive or avoid being deceived. Rather, its use must be recognized to have limitations if the operational commander is to utilize deception effectively.

CHAPTER VI

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS

The ability for the United States to achieve success in future deception operations is limited to the amount of effort that is put into deception today. Therefore, the following recommendations are presented in hopes that the use of deception will remain at the forefront of all operational plans.

1. The study of deception must place greater emphasis in U.S. professional military education curriculum. This study should not only focus on potential U.S. uses of deception but also on what can be expected of other nations regarding their use of deception. Students are well acquainted with enemy capabilities but how these capabilities can be disguised are seldom discussed.

2. Deception like any type of training needs to be exercised. All Wargaming as well as operational exercises should employ the use of deception so that its use will become second nature to the operational commander.

3. The successful employment of deception requires a unity of effort and therefore a separate component of all staffs should be tasked with ensuring that this unity is maintained. In addition, these components should ensure that the staffs are educated on the potential uses of deception.

4. Deception efforts must be given priority in terms of
providing resources. As has been shown throughout, deception can
provide enormous benefits for limited resources but the resources
needed must be provided.

5. Technological uses of deception must be continually
explored. Although these benefits may be short lived, the
initial benefits derived in achieving surprise could constitute
the difference between success and failure.

6. Finally, perhaps the greatest challenge to incorporating
operational deception is to change U.S. perception regarding its
use. The ingrained perception among the majority of U.S.
military personnel as well as civilian leaders on all levels is
the ability to win with overwhelming force via conventional
means. The discernment is that the United States does not need
to, "lie, cheat or steal." Although this perception is a
disadvantage today, it can be turned into a great advantage
tomorrow. Most countries expect the United States to play by
certain rules. This is not to say that the U.S. should break
international laws regarding armed conflict but rather that many
nations do not expect the U.S. to resort to such measures as
deception.[93] Herein rests the greatest advantage as the use of
deception will not be envisioned. Machiavelli exclaimed it best
when he said:

> "Although deceit is detestable in all other
> things, yet in the conduct of war it is laudable and
> honorable; and a commander who vanquishes an enemy by
> stratagem is equally praised with one who gains victory
> by force."[94]

CONCLUSIONS:

The question that begs to be asked is why would an operational commander needlessly put himself at a disadvantage? This is precisely what occurs when an operational commander forgoes the opportunity to employ deception.

This discourse has attempted to show the significant advantages that deception offers as a force multiplier requiring very few resources. Through examination of what deception offers, this paper discussed how deception presents distinct advantages regarding the operational principles of war. However, it was also recognized that deception is not meant as a substitute to sound operational planning and execution but rather as an additional tool for the operational commander.

Through an historical treatise it was demonstrated that deception can reap enormous advantages, but used incorrectly it can have significant consequences. There is little doubt that without the use of deception, the invasion of Normandy would have met with much less success and may have altogether failed.

Examinations of both the successes and failures of past operations have enormous utility in future applications. The lessons derived in this paper are thus intended to provide future operational commanders with information that is both applicable to the past as well as applicable to the future. What the future of technology holds on the ability to deceive is as yet unknown. What is certain is that there will always be someone trying to counter these new technologies. Nevertheless, it remains

imperative for the United States to remain at the forefront of new technologies.

Finally this discourse presented recommendations intended to keep the United States focused on maintaining deception at the forefront of operations. Joint Pub 3-0 states:

> "Deception operations are an integral element of joint operations. Planning for deception operations is top-down, in the sense that subordinate deception plans support the higher level plan."[95]

In the final analysis it is imperative that the United States follows its own advice on the use of deception as an integral element. To assume that one can always win by massive force and conventional means is to invite disaster and the unnecessary loss of life.

NOTES

1. Sun Tzu, <u>The Art of War</u>, translated by Samuel B. Griffith, (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 66.

2. Michael I. Handel, <u>War, Strategy and Intelligence</u>, (London: Frank Cass and Company, 1989), p. 310.

3. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>Basic National Defense Doctrine</u>, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1991), p. I-29.

4. Handel, p. 314.

5. <u>IBID</u>., p. 314.

6. <u>IBID</u>., p. 315, 320.

7. <u>IBID</u>., p. 339.

8. <u>IBID</u>., p. 311.

9. <u>IBID</u>., p. 399.

10. Sun Tzu, p. 77.

11. U.S. Department of the Army, <u>Army Field Manual 100-5</u>, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., June, 1993), p. 2-4. Note: Although the principles of war can be found in various military publications, the definitions used for this discourse will be derived from this manual.

12. Handel, p. 312. Note: Professor Handel utilizes the principle of concentration of forces in space vice mass.

13. U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, p. 2-5.

14. <u>IBID</u>.

15. Handel, p. 313.

16. U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, p. 2-4.

17. <u>IBID</u>., p. 2-5.

18. Carl Von Clausewitz, <u>On War</u>, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), P. 198.

19. <u>IBID</u>., p. 203.

20. U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, p. 2-5.

21. Michael Howard, <u>Strategic Deception in the Second World War</u>, (London: Her Britannic Majesty's Stationary Office, 1990), p. ix.

22. R.F. Hesketh, "Fortitude: A History of Strategic Deception in North Western Europe April, 1943 to May, 1945," unpublished after-action history of deception operations in north-west Europe, February 1949, p. 173.

23. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>Doctrine for Joint Operations</u>, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1991), p. II-3.

24. Anthony Cave Brown, <u>Bodyguard of Lies</u>, (New York, N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1975), v. 1, p. 478.

25. <u>IBID</u>., p. 479.

26. <u>IBID</u>., p. 481.

27. <u>IBID</u>., p. 510.

28. <u>IBID</u>., p. 510.

29. F.H. Hinsley and C.A.G. Simpkins, <u>British Intelligence in the Second World War</u>, volume IV, (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 238.

30. Brown, p. 510.

31. Lauran Paine, <u>D-Day</u>, (London: Robert Hale Ltd, 1981), p. 82. Also see Brown, p. 515.

32. Paine, pp. 81-82 and Brown, p. 515.

33. Brown, p. 516.

34. Michael Howard, <u>Strategic Deception in the Second World War</u>, (London: Britannic Majesty's Stationary Office, 1992), p. 115.

35. Paine, p. 82 and Brown, p. 515.

36. Brown, p. 524.

37. Paine, p. 85 and Brown, p. 524.

38. Brown, v. 2, p. 532, Howard, p. 120 and Paine p. 80.

39. Paine, pp. 79-80 and Brown, p. 532.

40. Howard, p. 121.

41. IBID.

42. IBID., p. 112.

43. IBID.

44. IBID., p. 113.

45. John Keegan, The Second World War, (New York, N.Y : Penguin Books USA inc., 1989), p. 373.

46. Brown, p. 588.

47. Howard, p. 128.

48. Howard, p. 129 and Brown, p. 590.

49. Howard, p. 132.

50. Handel, p. 405.

51. Charles Cruickshank, Deception in World War II, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 61.

52. IBID.

53. Cruickshank, p. 61 and Handel, p. 407 and Brown, p. 353.

54. Cruickshank, p. 63.

55. Brown, p. 353.

56. Cruickshank, p. 63.

57. Brown, p. 353.

58. Cruickshank, pp. 62-63.

59. IBID., p. 63.

60. IBID. Note: Quote was derived from the Public Record office of the Air Ministry Correspondence 1202 (25.8, 1943).

61. IBID.

62. IBID., p. 62.

63. IBID. Note: Author's source was the British War Cabinet Defense Ministry 79 62, f. 273; DEFE 2 458 (13.7, 1943).

64. IBID., pp. 66-67.

65. IBID., p. 67.

66. IBID.

67. Brown, p. 354-355.

68. IBID., p. 359.

69. IBID., p. 360.

70. Cruickshank, p. 73.

71. IBID. Note: Author's source was Military Headquarters Papers, SHAEF 10.9, 1943; Portsmouth Station Papers 275 and Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence 4241, 38A.

72. Brown, p. 362.

73. Handel, p. 406.

74. IBID., pp. 406-407.

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76. IBID.

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78. U.S. Office of Research and Development, Central Intelligence Agency, Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore, (Princeton, N.J.: Mathtech, Inc, 1980), p. 5. Also see John Macartney, "Intelligence: What it is and how to use it," (Intelligence: What it is and how to use it, January 1990), p. 11.

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80. Gilles Perrault, The Secret of D-Day, (Boston, MA.: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), pp. 171-172.

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82. Handel, p. 407, 409.

83. Michael I. Handel, "Operational Deception," Lecture, U.S. Naval War College, Newport RI: 13 January 1994.

84. Handel, p. 409.

85. John P. Campbell, Dieppe Revisited, (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1993), p. 208.

86. U.S. Office of Research and Development, p. 9. In addition, Professor Handel's lecture of 13 January 1994 covered acclimatization.

87. Brown, p. 737.

88. Handel lecture of 13 January 1994. A portion of the lecture addressed how the truth could be revealed so as not to be detrimental to the operation.

89. Howard, p. 128.

90. Cruickshank, p. 221.

91. Thomas G. Mahnken, "Why Third World Space Systems Matter," Orbis, fall 1991, A quarterly journal of world affairs published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, PA., pp. 563-579. This article discusses the proliferation of space technologies on third world countries and their ability to effectively target U.S. forces, thus denying the U.S. a technological advantage in camouflaging operations.

92. For additional information on the use of window as well as other technological innovations in W.W. II see: R.V. Jones, The Wizard War, (New York, N.Y.: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, Inc., 1978). Note: The reluctance to utilize "window" can be found on p. 289.

93. Handel, lecture of 13 January 1994.

94. John G. Hathaway, "Deception Operations: Doctrinal Side show or Operational Imperative?" Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1989, p. 36. Note: Author's source was Niccol'o Machiavelli. The Prince and the Discourses, p. 526.

95. Doctrine for Joint Operations, p. III-42.

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